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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
COTTONWOOD SANITARY 
DISTRICT, a public 
entity, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SANDY CITY, UTAH, a 
municipal corporation of 
the state of Utah, 
Defendant/Appellant 
LAWRENCE P. NEMELKA, Trustee, 
GORDON and VICKI HEINRICHS, 
Intervenors. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from a decision of the district court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-2-2Q") and -4 (as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellee, Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District, ("District"), is a public 
sewer improvement district organized pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 17A-1-301, et 
Case No. 930294-CA 
Priority # 15 
seq. It serves large portions of Sandy City, Big Cottonwood and Little Cottonwood 
canyons, and unincorporated portions of Salt Lake County. To serve its public function, 
the District must maintain an office for its administrative staff and a garage to house the 
vehicles it uses to inspect new construction, respond to emergency calls and the routine 
maintenance of the many miles of sewer lines in its system. 
Early in 1991, the District, after consulting with the planning staff of Sandy City, 
selected the site at issue for the location of its new office and garage complex. The District 
applied for a conditional use permit to construct its facilities in an R-l-8 zone, which was 
awarded by the Sandy City Planning Commission after a public hearing. The decision was 
appealed by several citizens to the Sandy City Council, which overruled the decision of the 
Planning Commission and revoked the conditional use permit. 
Pursuant to Rule 65B(a) and (e), U.R.Civ.Pro., the District sought review in the 
district court of a decision of Appellant's City Council reversing the decision of Sandy City's 
Planning Commission to issue a conditional use permit. After briefing and oral argument 
by the parties, the district court issued a memorandum decision ruling that the Sandy City 
Council could not appoint itself as the body to hear appeals of conditional use permit 
applications and that it therefore lacked authority to review the decision of the Planning 
Commission. The district court further ruled that since the decision of the Planning 
Commission was supported by substantial evidence, that decision would be affirmed. 
2 
Following the appeal to this Court, the Sandy City Board of Adjustment entertained 
an appeal of the Planning Commission decision. The Board of Adjustment affirmed the 
decision of the Planning Commission to issue the conditional use permit, and after a second 
appeal to the district court was dismissed, the Sandy City Planning and Building 
Department used a building permit and the Appellee commenced construction. Both the 
district court and this Court have denied Appellant's request that the district court's 
decision be stayed pending appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The District is a political subdivision of the State of Utah. (R. 2). 
2. On March 22, 1991, the District filed an application for a conditional use 
permit to construct an office and vehicle garage facility on Highland Drive in Sandy City, 
Utah. (R. 3). 
3. On May 16, 1991, the Sandy City Planning Commission granted the District 
a conditional use permit. (R. 124-35). 
4. On July 16, 1991, the Sandy City Council overturned the ruling of the 
Planning Commission and denied the conditional use permit. (R. 236). The District 
thereafter appealed to the district court and on November 30, 1992, the district court issued 
The Appellee reserves its right to assert that the subsequent proceeding conducted 
by the Sandy City Board of Adjustment upholding the conditional use permit issued by the 
Planning Commission is binding on Sandy City and entitles Appellee to proceed to 
complete its development without interference. 
3 
a Memorandum Decision in which it ruled that the Sandy City ordinance, appointing the 
City Council to hear appeals concerning the issuance of conditional use permits, was 
invalid, as granting executive powers to a legislative body. (R. 363-71). Accordingly, the 
district court issued its Judgment and Order reinstating the conditional use permit issued 
by the Sandy City Planning Commission. (R. 376). 
5. On December 15, 1992, the Sandy City Mayor, City Attorney and members 
of the Sandy City Council advised a citizens group which opposes the District's office 
project construction, to appeal the District's conditional use permit to the Sandy City Board 
of Adjustment. (See, Affidavit of R. Godfrey, Exhibit "B" to Appellee's Memorandum in 
Opposition To Appellant's Motion For Stay Pending Appeal, f 3). 
6. On January 3, 1993, after being so advised and encouraged by the Mayor of 
Sandy City, the Sandy City Council and the Sandy City Attorney, Robert Lunnen and others 
appealed the Planning Commission's decision to grant the conditional use permit, to the 
Sandy City Board of Adjustment under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-9-
407(2) and 10-9-704(2). (See, R. Godfrey Affid., OT 3 and 5). Sandy City allowed and 
encouraged the appeal and approved the retaining of separate legal counsel to represent 
and advise the Board of Adjustment in considering the appeal. Sandy City relied on the 
appeal to the Board of Adjustment as a formal review and appeal which stayed the issuance 
of a building permit to the District (Id., Sf 6). 
4 
7 On January 13, 1993, Sandy City filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing the 
district court's N ovember Ah 199 J IWcmoianiln n I - > mi 11 ' ?>'). 
-:, 8. Oil Febi i Jai > 10 1993, the Sandy City Board of Adjustment considered the 
appeals by Robert Lunnen and others of the Planning Commission's decision. On February 
17, 1993, the Sandy t .. ^ ,.,, ^ Adjustment • . ;„ . , .i. . . i 
Planning ("uniiiiissn * i.v.. . • ^ s ^nditional use permit. (See, Appellee's Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Suggestion of Mootness and Motion To Dismiss Appeal, 
Exhibit "C" thereof). After the final decision of the buaiu ,., Adjustment on I ebnjarv IN, 
19M3, ^.uuly ^'iiy IIMM UI .t in >• auction of the office 
complex, based oix the conditional use permit granted to the District by the Planning 
Commission as affirmed by the Board of Adjustment. (See, * .wuire) AUK:.. \ >), 
9 . ( • . . • : : •*. S •, - i K irict 
court, seeking review of the Board of Adjustment's decision to grant the application for a 
conditional use permit. Lunnen v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District (( i\il 
h o , V> tV'Jvl- i c\\ . . ! . 
10. In late April, 1993, the District entered into a construction contract with Culp 
Construction Company for construction of the office complex. The District, uiu not, at that 
lime, instil. •. ..; • i o ^ , K * ' V* ;,, 
<ll 1 ( 1 ) . 
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11. On May 3, 1993, the Honorable Leslie Lewis issued a ruling granting the 
District's Motion for Summary Judgment in Lunnen v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood 
Sanitary District (Civil No. 930901603). (See, Appellee's Memorandum in Support of 
Mootness and Motion To Dismiss Appeal, Exhibits "A" and "B" thereto). 
12. Based on the conditional use permit granted by the Sandy City Planning 
Commission as affirmed by the Sandy City Board of Adjustment, and based on the building 
permit issued by the City's Building Department and the dismissal of the appeal of the 
Board of Adjustment's decision, the District issued a notice to proceed with construction 
on May 3, 1993. Thereafter, the land was graded, excavations were made and footings and 
foundations for the garage were completed. In addition, the District's contractor began 
street excavation to bring storm drains and water, sewer and gas lines to the District's 
property. Since commencement of construction, the District's construction contract 
obligates it in the amount of $1.4 million. (See, R. Godfrey Affid., W 10 and 11). 
13. Sandy City moved for an order staying the ruling below pending this appeal, 
from both the district court and from this Court. Those motions were denied by orders 
dated July 26 and August 12, 1993, respectively. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court below did not err in overturning the decision of the Sandy City Council 
based on a holding which harmonized the municipal conditional use appeals statute, Utah 
Code Ann. Section 10-9-9, with the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, Utah 
6 
Code Ann. Section 10-3-1201, et seg. Nor did the district court err by exercising the 
required appellate review bianuc • • • . . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAI I HE 
SANDY CITY COUNCIL LACKED THE AUTHORITY TO HEAR 
APPEALS OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT APPLICATIONS 
FROM THE PLANNING COMMISSION 
A — The Municipal Conditional use Permit Appeals Statute Does Not Permit Sandy City 
To Appoint The City Council As The Appellate Body To Hear Appeals From Thq 
Planning Commission 
Sandy City is a municipal corporation of the State of Utah which has selected the 
separated powers, council-mayor form of government, also called the strong may i I'M in. 
The 1 - * isl:,f "'••!", die Sandy City Council, lacked 
authority to hear an appeal from the Planning Commission's grant of a conditional use 
permit, since hearing appeals of planning commission decisions \$ no; legislative LI nature, 
an*. - - >.iinr* ' a 'M'.Miii.M'k^ii'iMhi'. - / ' a s . This conclusion 
was based, principally, on two points of authority: ac I tah Supreme Court's decision 
in Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897
 vLUtii i ...u;. interpreting iwc upuonal 
L a - - v / r r a ; , !••:. A : _ m . N * . 1 M" 1 ^M. et scqa and, 2) 
; 
the text of Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9-9(2) , enacted in 1989, after the Scherbel 
decision. In the Scherbel decision, the Utah Supreme Court considered a situation 
where a landowner had applied for conceptual approval of plans for a development in a 
historic district in Salt Lake City, a process akin to a request for a conditional use permit. 
The Salt Lake City Planning Commission approved the landowner's plan and that decision 
was appealed to the City Council, which reversed it. As the District has in the case at bar, 
the landowner filed a petition for extraordinary relief. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that zoning administration matters are an executive 
function and reversed the district court, finding that the City Council could not hear the 
appeal from the Planning Commission's decision. It based its ruling on its previous decision 
in Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978), in which it had held that where a 
municipality had adopted the council-mayor form of government permitted in the Optional 
Forms of Municipal Government Act, Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-3-1201, et seg., there 
is created ". . . two separate, independent and equal branches of municipal government." 
U.C.A. § 10-3-1209. In Martindale, the Supreme Court held that approval o[ subdivision 
plats is an executive function: 
". . . [W]e cannot agree with the conclusion that the executive 
powers of the municipality are to be in some way shared. Such 
2 
Section 10-9-9, along with the rest of Title 10, Chapter 10, was repealed and 
replaced in 1991. Section 10-9-9 was replaced with Section 10-9-704. 
8 
a conclusion devises an anomalous form of government not 
heretofore known and not intended by the Act. 
When the Act is read in its entirety, and each provision thereof 
is read in context with all of the others, and when viewed in the light 
of the legislative history of municipal government in Utah, we are 
compelled to conclude that it in fact provides for the absolute 
separation of executive and legislative powers. 
Simply stated, legislative powers are policy making powers, while 
executive powers are policy execution powers. Legislative power, as 
distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but 
not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty to 
make such enforcement. The latter are executive functions. 
W hen viewed in the light of the foregoing concepts, the 
approval of subdivisions in accordance with the rules, policies, and 
procedures adopted by the legislative branch of municipal government 
clearly appears to be a function of the executive branch. 
581 P.2d 1022, 1027-28. (Emphasis supplied). 
In Scherbci, n,, .-. . , . • .. ,.. AiartinuaJi. Matim*-
As in Martindale, we hold Lhat the authority to resolve zoning 
disputes is properly an executive function rather than a legislative one. 
"I hus, a city council under the council-mayor form of government may 
not hear appeals from zoning decisions of a planning commission. 
758 P.2d at 899. 
9 
Believing he was bound by the Supreme Court's holding in Scherbel, the court below 
concluded that the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act would not permit the 
Sandy City Council to appoint itself to the executive function of hearing appeals from 
conditional use applications to the Planning Commission. The district court wrote: 
The Court concludes that the process of approving non-conforming 
uses or variances is not substantively different from approving 
conditional uses. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Scherbel 
decision is controlling in this case. 
(R. 368). 
Sandy City argues that an appeal of the Planning Commission decision on a 
conditional use permit application does not involve a "zoning dispute" which, under the, 
Scherbel decision, is a purely executive function. This contention is fatuous. Unlike a non-
conforming use, a conditional use permit allows a use which is allowed, not forbidden by 
the zoning ordinance, but which, because of the possibility that it could be incompatible in 
some respects with the zoning scheme, requires a special permit and special conditions. 
County of Imperial v. McDougal, 564 P.2d 14, 17 (Calif. 1977), application denied, 434 U.S. 
899 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977). 
There can be no question that when a municipality's legislative body enacts or 
amends a zoning ordinance, it is legislating: 
. . . [W]hen a city council purports to act pursuant to its own zoning 
ordinance to issue special use permits, it is not legislating, but is acting in its 
administrative capacity. 
10 
Lund v. City of Tumwater, 472 P.2d 550, 553-54 (Wa.^h. A|,p. iy;u), review denied, 
VJd , 7K Wiisli ''I " '^ i W-uli Mi '"Ti 
The action of the Sandy City Council being appealed in this case was not legislative 
in nature. No legislation resulted, no ordinance was enacted and no generally-applicable 
rules or t i. . •'• s 
Development Code notes that the Planning Commission's decision was "appealed" to the 
City Council, the Council took evidence and issued "findings of fact and conclusions of law" 
(K. - - .. 
I Jnder Sand) 's ordinance, whether a conditional use permit is appropriately granted 
requires the application of general policies to specific facts and standards which are spelled 
out i,. wic development L.uue itself Applying a specific set of ah eady-enacted policies to 
a spec-'i* . . ^rning * •:• — ,-'— nrnpcr'v cvvi ^ u\ :inv stretch of the 
imagination, be considered "legislation ; li .s an administrative function. The granting of 
an application for a conUiuuiuu use permit is not a deviatiuii from the zoning uidnuince 
:: i a "i e zonii lg" t I it is the administration of the ordinance, in compliance with it. 
Kristensen v. City of Eugene Planning Commission, 544 P.2d 591, 593 (Ore. App. 1976). 
II III II III11!1" "I Aiiiit'iitliiiniif in Si 11 mi 10 (> (l Did Mini Overrule the Scherbel Decision. 
Sandy City, while conceding that determination of zoning disputes is an executive, 
rather than a legislative, function, urged the district court that its city council coL;ij, alter 
the amendment of Section 10-9-9(2), appoint itself as the body to hear appeals of planning 
commission decisions on conditional use permits. Judge Rigtrup dismissed this argument 
as "simply untenable". (R. 367). The district court reasoned that the separation of powers 
mandated by Section 10-3-1209 for Sandy City and the Supreme Court's unequivocal 
holding in Scherbel that appeals from zoning decisions are an executive function not within 
the province of a city council, required overturning the decision under review despite the 
post-Scherbel amendment of Section 10-9-9. 
Prior to its amendment in 1989, Utah Code Ann. Section 10-9-9 simply provided that 
a municipality's Board of Adjustment was to be the appellate body for any person aggrieved 
by a zoning decision. The 1989 amendment added sub-section (2), stating: 
(2) Appeals from decisions of the planning and zoning 
commission regarding conditional use permits shall be heard by the 
board of adjustment unless the legislative body of the municipality by 
ordinance has designated another body as the appellate body for those 
matters. 
(Emphasis supplied). Sandy City contends that the 1989 amendment to Section 10-9-9(2) 
overruled the Scherbel decision and allows the legislative body of a municipality to hear 
appeals of planning commission decisions on conditional use permits, even though the 
Supreme Court in Scherbel clearly held this to be an executive, not a legislative, function. 
However, it is almost too obvious to note that the 1989 amendment to Section 10-9-9(2) 
only says that the legislative body may appoint "another body" to hear such appeals; it does 
not say that the legislative body may appoint itself in a council-mayor form of government. 
12 
The Scherbel decision was based on the separation of powers required by Utah Code 
Ann. Section 10-3-1209 of the Forms of Municipal Government Act, allocating functions 
between a city's legislative and executive branches. Sandy City is asking this Court to infer 
that a city council may appoint itself to hear planning commission conditional use permit 
3 
appeals, when the legislature could easily have said so, but did not. To ascribe the 
meaning Sandy City wishes to impose on the 1989 amendment to Section 10-9-9(2) requires 
that the Court find, by implication, an amendment or repeal of the Optional Forms of 
Municipal Government Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Scherbel. 
Amendments of statutes by implication, like repeals by implication, are not favored: 
An implied amendment is an act which purports to be independent, 
but which in substance alters, modifies or adds to a prior act. To be 
effective, an amendment of a prior act ordinarily must be expressed. 
Amendments by implication, like repeals by implication, are not 
favored and will not be upheld in doubtful cases nor when they raise 
constitutional questions. The legislature will not be held to have 
changed a law it did not have under consideration while enacting a 
later law, unless the terms of the subsequent act are so inconsistent 
with the provisions of the prior law that they cannot stand together. 
Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, Section 22.13 (4th ed.) (Emphasis 
supplied). When the Utah Legislature amended Section 10-9-9(2), it did not say that the 
legislative body of a municipality with a council-mayor form of government could, itself, 
° Judge Ginsburg's observation in N.R.D.C. v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 317 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) applies as well to the Utah Legislature: "It should go without saying that the 
National Legislature well knows how to amend a statute when it so desires." 
13 
hear appeals of conditional use permits from the planning commission, only that it could 
appoint "another body as the appellate body for those matters." The 1989 amendment is 
not inconsistent with the Scherbel decision unless the court interprets it to mean that in a 
council-mayor form of government with separated powers the city council may appoint itself 
to hear conditional use permit appeals. 
This Court has previously observed: 
As a general proposition, implied repeals are not favored and are 
found only if there is a manifest inconsistency or conflict between the 
earlier and later statutes. 
Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Board, 757 P.2d 882, 884-85 (Utah App. 1988), affd, 783 
P.2d 540 (Utah 1989). See also, State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1980); Doe v. 
Durtschi, 716 P.2d 1238, 1250 (Idaho 1986); T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Utah App. 
1988). Accordingly, in the absence of "manifest inconsistency or conflict" between Sections 
10-9-9(2) (as amended) and Section 10-3-1209, they must be harmonized. Only when the 
two statutes are irreconcilably conflicting will the later statute be held to amend or repeal 
the first in the absence of an express provision. Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Board, 
supra. Here, the 1989 amendment to Section 10-9-9(2) and the separation of executive and 
legislative powers required by the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act can be 
read quite consistently if the municipality's legislative body may not appoint itself to hear 
conditional use permit appeals instead of the board of adjustment. 
14 
Sandy City's argument that the amendment to Section 10-9-9(2) means that any body 
other than the planning commission may hear such appeals is an interpretation of the 
statute, but it is not the only interpretation. Only a handful of municipalities in Utah have 
adopted the council-mayor form of government since the Optional Forms Of Municipal 
Government Act was enacted in 1977. In the remainder, of the state's cities and towns 
there are no ". . .separate, independent, and equal branches of municipal government. . ." 
U.C.A. § 10-3-1209. For the vast majority of Utah municipalities the Scherbel decision had 
no effect. Yet, Sandy City wishes us to accept, on faith, that the Legislature actually 
considered the ramifications of the 1989 amendment to Section 10-9-9 would have on the 
separation of powers mandated by the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act in 
municipalities adopting the council-mayor system and that the Legislature decided to permit 
the legislating bodies of such communities to appoint themselves to decide planning 
commission appeals on conditional use permits, an entirely executive function. This 
construction is incredible and results in a blatant inconsistency between statutes. 
Since the 1989 amendment to Section 10-9-9(2) does not expressly abrogate 
Section 10-3-1209, it must be construed consistently with the Scherbel decision holding that 
a city council's function is limited to legislative matters and not executive or administrative 
functions such as the review of zoning decisions. This is consistent with rules of 
construction disfavoring amendments or repeals by implication and requiring that later 
statutes be harmonized with earlier enactments to maintain a consistent body of law. 
15 
POINT n 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN BASING ITS RULING 
ON THE CITY COUNCIL'S LACK OF AUTHORITY TO HEAR 
APPEALS OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT APPLICATIONS. 
In Point I of Appellant's Brief, Sandy City argues that the district court erred 
because it decided the case on a specific basis which the parties had not raised. However, 
by this contention, Sandy City misconstrues the appellate nature of the district court's 
inquiry under Rule 65B(e)(4). 
The Sandy City Council conducted a public hearing at which it heard evidence from 
the Planning Commission in support of the Commission's decision, received statements from 
interested citizens, and from the District. (R. 139). The Council adopted a resolution 
denying the permit and overruling the Planning Commission decision, including what it 
termed "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law". (R. 235). 
This judicial or quasi-judicial action of the City Council is reviewable by the district 
court pursuant to Rule 65B, U. R. Civ. Pro., through the appellate review procedure 
approved by this Court in Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah App. 
1988), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). Specifically, the action of the city council 
must be examined under the provisions of Rule 65(B)(e)(4), which states: 
Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's 
review shall not extend further than to determine whether the 
respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
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The cases cited by Sandy City stand for the proposition that a trial court may not 
adjudicate issues not raised by the parties. But the district court in this case was reviewing 
not trying the determination of the City Council. The district court does not try the issue 
de novo, but applies the standard of review specified in Rule 65(B)(e)(4), Le ,^ whether the 
city council "regularly pursued its authority". Under this rule, the district court has a duty 
to determine, as it did in the case at bar, whether the action was illegal, regardless of 
whether the issue is argued by the parties. Judge Rigtrup did not reach the issue of 
whether the Sandy City Council's action was arbitrary and capricious because he decided 
that its action was illegal, since Section 10-9-9(2) did not state that the city council could 
be appointed to hear conditional use permit appeals from the planning commission and 
could not do so without violence to the separation of powers established by Section 10-3-
1209 of the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. This is not a situation where 
a trier of fact "infringed upon counsel's role of advocacy", Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 
247 (Utah 1983), but is a matter of an appellate tribunal exercising the specific standard 
of review required by statute. In sum, the district court was justified, and required, to find 
as it did, even though the specific question was not raised by the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Sandy City's appeal teeters on a single point. It asks this Court to re-draft the 
statute and rule that the insertion of a phrase in Section 10-9-9(2), that "another body" may 
be substituted for the board of adjustment in deciding conditional use permit appeals, 
17 
enables the city council to appoint a legislative body, the city council itself, to fulfill this 
purely executive function in contravention of the strict separation of powers required by an 
earlier statute, the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. This contention is, as 
the District Court put it, "simply untenable". 
The District Court exercised the judgment required by Rule 65B and correctly ruled 
that the Sandy City Council did not have the authority to vacate the District's conditional 
use permit. That judgment should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this &&> day of August, 1993. 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COTTONWOOD 
SANITARY DISTRICT, a public 
entity, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDY CITY, UTAH, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant, 
LAWRENCE P. NEMELKA, Trustee, 
GORDON and VICKI HEINRICHS, 
Intervenors. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 910905227 
Plaintiff Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District 
seeks by its Amended Complaint herein relief from a 
determination made by the Sandy City Council on or about July 
30, 1991 to reverse the decision of the Sandy City Planning 
Commission to issue plaintiff a conditional use permit. Said 
relief is sought pursuant to Rule 65D(e) (2) (A) & (B) , Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff has moved for an Order reversing the decision of 
the Sandy City Council and reinstating the conditional use 
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permit granted by the Sandy City Planning Commission. The 
parties have submitted Memoranda on the issues. Records of the 
proceedings of the Sandy City Planning Commission and the Sandy 
City Council have been submitted for the Court's review. The 
Court heard oral arguments from the respective parties. 
Thereafter, the parties submitted to the Court for its decision 
whether or not the Sandy City Council exceeded its authority or 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in reversing the decision of 
the Sandy City Planning Commission to issue plaintiff a 
conditional use permit. The Court has considered the records 
of the Sandy City proceedings and the Memoranda submitted by 
the parties. 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff sought by its application to Sandy City to obtain 
a conditional use permit to construct an administrative site 
consisting of an office, vehicle garage and related parking 
facility at 8620 South Highland Drive, Sandy, Utah. Following 
several hearings, the Planning Commission determined that 
plaintiff's proposed facility was a "public service," thus 
qualifying it as a conditional use within the R-l-8 Residential 
zone. Sandy City Development Code, Section 15-7-5(c)(8). 
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After prescribing a number of conditions, to which plaintiff 
agreed to be bound, the Sandy City Planning Commission approved 
plaintiff's conditional use of the subject property on May 16, 
1991. 
Some of the residents of the area filed an appeal therefrom 
with the Sandy City Counsel on June 3, 1991. The applicable 
statute controlling appeals from decisions of planning and 
t 
zoning commissions at that time was found in Section 10-9-9(2), 
Utah Code Ann. (1991 Cum Supp.). The controlling provision 
which became effective April 24, 1989, provided: 
Appeals from the decisions of the planning 
and zoning commission regarding conditional use 
permits shall be heard by the board of adjustment 
unless the legislative body of the municipality 
by ordinance has designated another body as the 
appellate body for those matters. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The statute appears to have enabled the legislative body of a 
municipality to designate another body to hear such appeals; 
however, there is nothing in such enablement indicating a 
legislative intent to change or alter the powers exercisable by 
a board of adjustment. In effect, the statutory scheme simply 
allows another body to act as the board of adjustment. 
Sandy City Council by its Ordinance 15-23-7 appointed 
itself as the appeals body in such cases. A copy of said 
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ordinance is attached hereto as "Attachment A.11 Based upon 
said ordinance, the Sandy City Council then proceeded to handle 
the appeal. 
Subsection (3) of the ordinance permitted the Council to 
hold public hearings or to conduct evidentiary review outside 
the Planning Commission record to determine whether: 
(b) the proposed use would (i) influence patterns 
of growth adverse to the integrity of the 
comprehensive plan as implemented by the zoning 
ordinance; . . . or (iii) undermine the health, 
safety or welfare of the surrounding neighborhood 
or community. 
At the Council meeting of the Sandy City Council on July 
16, 1991, the Council received input from Gil Avellar, Senior 
Planner, who presented a detailed history of the project and 
the prior approval process. In addition, the Council received 
significant comments from the public and permitted the response 
of plaintiff. 
On July 30, 1991 the Council voted to deny the conditional 
use authority and reverse the earlier decision of the Sandy 
Planning Commission. Resolution #91-60 C was entered formally 
by the Council on October 1, 1991 disapproving the Salt Lake 
County Cottonwood Sanitary District's application for a 
conditional use of the subject property. Apparently Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were also entered. 
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Counsel for defendant in Sandy City's Memorandum has 
identified the Sandy City Council as the legislative body of 
Sandy City. In addition, he points out that Sandy City is 
organized under the "optional" form of municipal government as 
provided in Section 10-3-1201, et seq., Utah Code Ann. 
"The authority to resolve zoning disputes is properly an 
executive function rather than a legislative one." Scherbel v. 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah, 1988). 
Counsel for Sandy City recognizes this, yet suggests that the 
Utah State Legislature amended Section 10-9-9/2), Utah Code 
Ann., to correct the effects of this decision and the decision 
in Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 
. . . . . 1 
1988), on municipalities using conditional uses. This 
position is simply untenable. 
Section 10-3-1209, Utah Code Ann., provides that: 
The optional form of government known as the 
council-mayor form vests the government of a 
municipality which adopts this form in two 
separate, independent, and equal branches of 
municipal government; the executive branch 
consisting of a mayor and the administrative 
departments and officers; and the legislative 
branch consisting of a municipal council. 
(Emphasis added.) 
1
 Although counsel for Sandy City acknowledged that 
Scherbel stood for the proposition that the resolving of zoning 
disputes involves an executive function, no mention was made of 
the fundamental separation of powers problem addressed in that 
case and involved in this case. 
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The Utah Supreme Court at page 899 in Scherbel, supra, 
concluded that, "A city council under the council-mayor form of 
government may not hear appeals from zoning decisions of a 
planning commission," The Court concludes that the process of 
approving non-conforming uses or variances is not substantively 
different from approving conditional uses. Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that the Scherbel decision is controlling in 
this case. 
A review of the various Sandy City records discloses that 
there was substantial basis for the approval of the conditional 
use permit by the Sandy City Planning Commission in favor of 
the Salt Lake Cottonwood Sanitary District, The Sandy City 
Council being without authority to review planning commission 
decisions, the grant of the conditional use permit by the Sandy 
City Planning Commission should be reinstated. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders entry of an 
order reversing the decision of the Sandy City Council embodied 
in Resolution #91-60C entered October 1, 1991, affirming the 
decision of the Sandy City Planning Commission of May 16, 1991 
and ordering the planning commission to issue the conditional 
use permit to Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District 
forthwith. 
S.L. COUNTY V. SANDY CITY PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Counsel for plaintiff shall submit an appropriate Order on 
the rulings herein contained. 
Dated this day of November, 1992. 
K 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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i-2 3-^ -15-23-ry - CONDITIONAL USE APPEALS 
(1) All appeals from decisions of the Planning Commission 
regarding conditional use permits shall be heard by the City 
Council. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), review of 
decisions of the Planning Commission shall be confined to the 
administrative record developed by the Commission, 
(3) The City Council may hold a public hearing or permit an 
evidentiary review outside the Planning Commission record to 
determine whether: 
(a) An alleged procedural irregularity has occurred that 
does not appear in the record. 
(b) The proposed use would (i) influence patterns of growth 
adverse to the integrity cf the comprehensive plan as 
implemented by the zoning ordinance; (ii) have a long-term 
detrimental impact on City resources available for capital 
improvements or urban services; or (iii) undermine the 
health, safety or welfare of the surrounding neighborhood or 
community. 
(4) Hearings may be held by the City Council itself, cr by 
any Council member, hearing examiner, or agent appointed by the 
(5) The City Ccuncil may overrule any approval or 
disapproval by the Planning Commission, or any conditions 
imposed- It may approve or deny the conditional use, impose 
additional conditions thereon, or remand the appeal to the 
Planning Commission for further consideration. 
(6) Any decision by the City Ccuncil approving cr denying 
ATTACHMENT "A" 
ADDENDUM "B" 
10-3-1209. Council-mayor and council-manager 
form defined. 
The optional form of government known as the 
council-mayor form vests the government of a munic-
ipality which adopts this form in two separate, inde-
pendent, and equal branches of municipal govern-
ment; the executive branch consisting of a mayor and 
the administrative departments and officers; and the 
legislative branch consisting of a municipal council. 
The optional form known as the coimcil-manager 
form vests the government of the municipality in a 
municipal council which shall be deemed the govern-
ing body of the municipality and a manager ap-
pointed by the council. 1979 
ADDENDUM "C 
10-9-9. Appeals to board — Time — Persons en-
titled — Transmission of papers — Ap-
peals from planning and zoning com-
mission. 
(1) Appeals to the board- of adjustment may' be 
taken by any person aggrieved or. by any .officer,'de-
partment, board, or bureau: of the municipality af-
fected by any decision of the administrative officer. 
The appeal shall be taken within a reasonable time, 
as provided by the rules of the board,: by filing, with 
the officer from whom the appeal is taken and*with 
the board of adjustment a notice of appeal specifying 
the grounds for the appeal. The officer from whom the 
appeal is taken shall immediately transmit to the 
board of adjustment all the papers constituting the 
record upon which the action appealed from was 
taken. 
(2) Appeals from decisions of the planning and zon-
ing commission regarding conditional use permits( 
shall be heard by the board of adjustment unless the1 
legislative body of the municipality by ordinance has* 
designated another body as the appellate body for 
those matters. 1989 
ADDENDUM "D" 
Rule 65B UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by 
a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be 
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompa-
nied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for 
costs and damages tha t may be recovered against the petitioner in the 
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided 
for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a 
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public 
office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation 
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer 
does or permits any act tha t results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where 
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally 
incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state 
of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or 
(E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights, 
privileges or franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary 
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(e), Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply wi th duty. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are 
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may 
petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed 
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, t rust or station; or 
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person 
has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to 
which the petitioner is entitled. 
(3) P r o c e e d i n g s on t he peti t ion. On the filing of a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior 
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named 
as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the 
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance 
with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in 
nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine 
whether the respoudent has regularly pursued its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991.) 
